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FIVE EASY PIECES: MOTIFS OF
HEALTH LAW
Sandra H. Johnson'
IN FIVE EASY PIECES,^ the film's title refers to a selection of
compositions for the piano that Bobby, the Jack Nicholson character,
played in a childhood recital. He selected the pieces only because
they were easy to play. Of course, some compositions sound difficult
to play but are quite easy, and others sound easy but are quite diffi-
cult.^ "Five Easy Pieces" in the title of this essay does not refer to
compositions for the piano but rather to a selection of familiar motifs,
some simple and some difficult, of teaching and practicing health law.
THEY JUST DON'T GET IT
We have all been there, walking away from a talk or a meeting
and thinking: "They just don't get it." Sometimes, it is the lawyers
shaking their heads about the doctors; and at other times, it is the doc-
tors stunned speechless by the ignorance of the lawyers. For example,
tell doctors that they have a "conflict of interest" in relation to a pro-
posed protocol for research with human subjects, and they believe that
you have accused them of unethical behavior. In my experience, doc-
tors tend to assume that a conflict of interest exists only when they
actually have made a "bad" decision motivated by their financial in-
terest in the sponsor of the research. Lawyers (and, therefore, federal
agencies regulating research) view conflicts as objective, structural,
and rule-based. You could be a paragon of virtue, and you would be
conflicted out of representing a client if a prohibited conflict of inter-
est exists.^ Doctors, in contrast, view conflicts of interest as relating
to the individual's character and ability to resist temptation.'' We law-
^ Sandra H. Johnson, J.D., LL.M., Tenet Chair in Health Law and Ethics,
Saint Louis University School of Law and Center for Health Care Ethics; Professor of
Law in Internal Medicine, Saint Louis Llniversity School of Medicine.
' FIVE EASY PIECES (Columbia Pictures 1970).
^ Posting of Jed Curtis, jed_curtis@hotmail.com, to lMDB Message Board:
Five Easy Pieces (Sept. 7, 2003), at
http://www.imdb.eom/title/tt0065724/board/nest/2003269.
' See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(2003).
"* The focus on resisting temptation is very well explained in Nancy J.
Moore, What Doctors Can Learn From Lawyers About Conflicts of Interest, 81 B.U.
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yers might say that doctors just don't get it when they get angry at us
for telling them that they have a conflict of interest. And, perhaps, we
just don't get it when we get defensive at their response and fail to
understand their starting point.
In regard to a somewhat older issue, many lawyers viewed living
wills, in their heyday, as tools that would effectively control future
treatment decisions using legal principles of enforceable contract.
More than a few doctors told more than a few lawyers that things
were not so simple at the end of life. The doctor-patient relationship
is not a master-servant relationship and is not one-way, no matter how
autonomy- or rights-focused we lawyers are inclined to be by training
and temperament.^ The human body is more complex than lawyers
tend to grasp, and its ways of dying or surviving do not fit easy check-
lists for decisions. Maybe we lawyers just didn't get it. And, perhaps,
doctors simply did not appreciate "outsiders" imposing the "legal"
values of autonomy and choice into the physician-patient relationship.
Health law's defining characteristic is that it attempts to bridge
such gaps in culture and understanding between law and medicine and
the other health care professions. Its purpose, both as an area of study
and practice, is not simply to take the dominant legal values of the
time—such as privacy, autonomy, efficiency, and adversarial reason-
ing—and impose them onto medicine. Nor is its purpose simply to
subordinate the law's values to the values of health care as they might
exist at the time, whether they are paternalism, caring, the technologi-
cal imperative, heroism, or death denial. From its very beginning,
health law, in the form of bioethics or liability or economic regulation,
has been viewed variously as the dangerous interloper that would ir-
reparably damage the patient-physician relationship or as the heroic
figure jousting with a self-serving profession.^ If carried forward to
L. REV. 445 (2001).
^ For a brief but somewhat fuller development of this critique see Sandra H.
Johnson, Sequential Domination, Autonomy and Living Wills, 9 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 113(1987) (applying Jay Katz's informed consent model to patient autonomy in
the context of living wills).
'' For a variety of views on the impact of law on medical ethics and practice
see DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991) (discussing how physi-
cian discretion has been curtailed by legislators, regulators, judges, institutions, bio-
ethicists, and consumer-oriented patients); GEORGE ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE
(1988) (arguing that applying legal principles to medical dilemmas will give patients
more control over medical decisions); GEORGE ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW
OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS (1993) (exploring the values that should determine the legal
standards of health care); Alexander Morgan Capron, Why the Law and Life Sci-
ences?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 42,43 (explaining the natural
involvement of law in the bioethies field and its positive and negative effects); Alex-
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the point of caricature, neither of these characterizations is accurate.
Health law draws its identity as a field from the commitment to work
from a deep insight into the culture and context in which the law will
operate.
I DON'T KNOW
Sometimes "I don't know" is the only correct answer. Health law
teachers need to teach that answer, and health lawyers need to practice
it.
Civil Procedure was not my favorite class in the first year of law
school. I never really got it, at least at that point, but I learned an im-
portant lesson from that course. One day in class, I heard my name
called and became alert enough to hear the professor asking me
whether the federal jurisdiction rule at issue meant "residence" or
"domicile." I had not focused on the discussion the class had been
having, so I was at a distinct disadvantage in coming up with an an-
swer. I looked at the rule in front of me and decided that I couldn't
even fake it. So I answered, "I don't know." What followed was the
life lesson.
The instructor nearly jumped up and down with joy and shouted,
"Of course, you don't know! You can't know! It's just not there."
That day I learned that "I don't know" can be just the right answer.
This lesson has come in very handy in health law and in bioethics. In
fact, I sometimes have had the entire class say "I don't know" out
loud together just to get over the embarrassment of using the phrase.
Think of how often in the health care context the accurate answer
to a question about the law is "I don't know." In some cases, "I don't
know" is the right answer because we have not yet done the home-
work that would reveal the correct answer. Obviously, it is not safe to
"fake" answers in such a circumstance. It is equally unsafe to provide
a firm answer when, due to the nature of the law, the lawyer is exer-
cising educated and professional judgment in drawing any conclusion
at all. For example, in many states, like Missouri, there are only one,
or perhaps two, court decisions concerning end-of-life treatment deci-
ander Morgan Capron, What Contributions Have Social Science and the Law Made to
the Development of Policy on Bioethics?, DAEDALUS, Fall 1999, at 295 (discussing
how the law's influence on bioethics favors abstract principles rather than empirical
evidence); Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise
of a New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 395 (1994) (discussing the paradigm shift
from general abstract principles to a patient-by-patient consideration); Mark A. Hall,
Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002) (emphasizing the role of trust
in the physician-patient relationship).
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sions^ and nothing more comprehensive than an advanced directive
for health care statute.^ In this and similar circumstances, it is abso-
lutely critical to be aware and honest about whether there is law that
determines the course that has to be followed, or whether we are sim-
ply guessing, from an educated perspective, but guessing nonetheless.
Too often, I hear about lawyers who tell their health care clients
"you can't" or "you must" do something when there simply is no law
that requires anything. An exercise I use in my Bioethies class to
bring that point home is to provide the students with a simple set of
facts involving a very young child in the end stages of a terminal ill-
ness whose parents want ventilator support withdrawn, even though
the child cannot breathe on his own. The question is also "simple": Is
it legal to withdraw ventilator support in this situation in the state of
Missouri? That question is divided into 10 or 12 sub-questions, for
example: Is it homicide? Is it child abuse or neglect? Is it legal un-
der the federal "Baby Doe" regulations? Is it legal under the Missouri
hospital licensing statute and regulations? There is no case or statute
on point in Missouri to resolve this question, yet students invariably
report that it is illegal to withdraw ventilator support, and may amount
to homicide or abuse, for example, because there is no law that ex-
pressly permits withdrawal.
This is certainly a teaching moment. Are treatment decisions that
will result in death illegal unless a specific statute or case authorizes
the decision? Where do the commonly shared values and legally rec-
ognizable standards in health care develop—only in the courts or leg-
islatures? The appropriate answer to the question asked in the exer-
cise is not a bold "Yes" or "No" but rather, "I don't know." That an-
swer should be stated and explained quite clearly and earefiilly. The
lawyer should proceed, of course, to discuss his or her best judgment
on what the legal risks of the action are and how those risks ean be
minimized, taking into account the institution's particular identity and
mission. In this ease, for example, the lawyer might refer to policies
and guidelines from relevant health care organizations; recommend
' Compare In re Warren, 858 S.W. 2d 263, 265 (Mo. App. 1993) (allowing
a guardian to make medical decisions for an incompetent person without the court's
authorization), with Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988), affdsub
nom. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, (1990) (holding that an incom-
petent person retains the right to life and guardians are not permitted to make end of
life decisions). See also In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991) (presenting essentially the same situation as that of Nancy Cruzan but finding
her case inapplicable).
" See. e.g., Uniform Rights of the Terminally 111 Act of 1985, Mo. REV.
STAT. § 459.010-.055 (1992) (Missouri's living will statute). See also Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care Act, Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.800 -.865 (2001).
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that prognosis be verified through a consultation; make sure that the
hospital's ethics committee looks at the case; advise the hospital about
the option of a court order in particularly extreme circumstances; ad-
vise consulting others in the area to see what they do; and so on. The
lawyer who begins with "I don't know" where the state of the law is
uncertain can provide the health care client with the most valuable
professional advice.
Lawyers who pronounce "shall nots" to health care clients in
situations in which there are no commandments are dangerous, and
health care clients who defer too much to their lawyers run the risk of
breaching their values and acting contrary to their own best interests.
As a defense against lawyers who don't know how to say "I don't
know," or its first cousin but not twin, "it depends," I advise health
care clients to avoid asking their lawyers whether they can do some-
thing and, rather, to ask their lawyer what the legal risks of their pro-
posed course of action are and how best to eliminate or manage those
risks.
THE MUSIC GOES ROUND AND ROUND
Having worked in health law for more than twenty-five years, I
am no longer surprised when an issue thought to be resolved explodes
onto the scene once again several years after it was tied up with a rib-
bon and put on the back shelf marked "things done." Health law
seems to have a robust replay function.
For example, not too many years ago, it seemed that the wide-
spread legal and medical acceptance of brain death had produced the
ultimate compromise of the issues raised by the determination of
death, and had provided a satisfactory response to the relationship
between brain death and the requirements of organ harvesting. Of
course, the controversy over the status of anencephalic infants was hot
for a moment a few years ago;^ and there is the persistent debate be-
tween whole brainers and higher brainers.'" Not until the practice of
harvesting organs from non-heart beating donors (NHBDs)" became
' E.g., In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992) (holding that anencephalic
infants are considered alive so long as their cardiopulmonary system is functioning).
'" Compare James L. Bemat et al . Defining Death in Theory and Practice,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1982, at 5-9 (arguing against the higher brain function
formulation to define death), with Robert M. Veatch, Correspondence: What it Means
to be Dead, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1982, at 45 (criticizing the conclusion
reached in the Bemat article, and arguing in favor of higher brain function require-
ment). See also THE DEFINITION OF DEATH: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES (Stuart
J. Youngner et al., eds. 1999) (presenting the controversies surrounding the many
definitions of death).
" For one of the earlier scholarly discussions of organ harvesting from
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relatively widespread; however, was there a substantial, not-solely-
theoretical assault on the whole brain death standard. What seems to
have moved us to NHBDs is the convergence of the principles of re-
fusal of life-sustaining medical treatment and the determination of
death. One plus one equals two: It is legal and moral for a person (or
surrogate) to consent to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
and there is no legal or moral obligation to resuscitate a person who is
dying because of the refusal of life-sustaining treatment; therefore, it
is legal to declare them dead after waiting a very short time after re-
moval of the ventilator even though the whole brain death criteria
does not apply and the cessation of cardiopulmonary function is not
irreversible.'^
If the re-emergence of the determination of death standard is ex-
plained, at least in part, by the fusion of two legal principles, waxing
and waning interest in other controversies depends in part on the reve-
lation of a scandal as well as the resulting media coverage of the is-
sues raised by the revelation of particular abuses. The "scandal syn-
drome" in regulation may help explain the recent focus on regulatory
intervention in research on human participants. The legal framework
for oversight of research with human subjects seemed to have become
relatively well-settled around the Common Rule after considerable
attention in the 1970s.'^  Nevertheless, the question of the appropriate
standards and oversight for such research exploded in the later 1990s
as a critical issue once again. The intense growth of research in the
clinical setting and the shift from public to private funding of research
explain some of this review of standards. More influential, I think,
were the high-profile scandals and the resulting media coverage of
certain experiments, which triggered the establishment of a presiden-
NHBDs, see generally John A. Robertson, Policy Issues in a Non-Heart-Beating
Donor Protocol, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 241 (1993). For more recent treatments
of NHBD protocols see COMMITTEE ON THE NON-HEART-BEATING TRANSPLANTATION
II, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION:
PRACTICE AND PROTOCOLS (2000). See also James M. DuBois, Is Organ Procurement
Causing the Death of Patients?, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 21 (2002) (discussing the im-
portance of defining death in the organ donor context).
'^  See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 2 HEALTH LAW 255-65 (Practitioner Trea-
tise Ser., 2d ed. 2000) (describing the definitions of death and the policies for declar-
ing the time of death).
'•* See Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experi-
mentation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST.
LOUIS. U. L.J. 63 (1993) (providing a history of the enactment of regulations for
human subject research).
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tial commission and put a harsh spotlight on the previously estab-
lished framework.''*
A final example: A recurrent or reform-resistant "malpractice cri-
sis" syndrome seemed to have been finally tamed by the tort reform
efforts of the 1970s and 1980s, and the pattern of decennial crises was
disrupted when it effectively skipped the 1990s. Now it is apparent
that it simply may have been that the Clinton health reform plan
pushed the crisis syndrome into a temporary remission. The solution
for the first medical malpractice crisis of the twenty-first century is
still not clear. Whatever the causes of this cycle are—an economic
downturn that sours insurers' investments, or ravenous plaintiffs'
lawyers, or overly generous juries, or the thirst for a nonjudgmental,
systemic approach to medical error, or a Republican administration
and Congress—the issue is front and center again after a quiescence
of nearly two decades. The solutions that are put in place this time
should come with a warranty of somewhat less than ten years.
PAYING THE PIPER AND CALLING THE TUNE
Message to the legal profession from health law: Do not ever buy
into a federally funded program for the reimbursement of legal ex-
penses to a large non-financially defined population unless you also
want to feel the full force of regulatory activity under the federal
spending authority.'^ Much of health law, including the "transac-
tional" areas such as reimbursement and fraud and abuse and the
"quality" areas such as certification and fraud and abuse and the "pa-
tients' rights" areas such as EMTALA, may be the house that Medi-
care built.'^ Almost all federal regulation of health care, with few
'•* See Greg Koski, Research, Regulations, and Responsibility: Confronting
the Compliance Myth - A Reaction to Professor Gatter, 52 EMORY L.J. 403 (2003)
(discussing the impetus for regulations for human subjects research and the concerns
that still need to be addressed as part of a symposium issue on Human Subjects Re-
search and Conflicts of Interest). See also, Jesse A. Goldner, Symposium on Human
Subjects Research: Redux, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 358 passim (2002) (giving an
overview of the symposium). The Institute of Medicine has issued several reports
recently concerning oversight of experimentation with human participants. See, e.g..
COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (Daniel D. Federman et al. eds.,
2003).
" Whether this message should have been heeded by the pharmaceutical
industry, who are the apparent winners in the recent Medicare drug benefit amend-
ments, remains to be seen. Although there are some restrictions on federal interven-
tion in the amendments, these restrictions are only self-imposed by Congress. H.R. 1,
108th Cong. (2003).
"^  See Thomas Wm. Mayo, The First Fifty Years: Health Law's Greatest Hit,
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exceptions,'^ emerges from the spending authority of the federal gov-
ernment. It would be a good exercise in reconstructive history to
imagine what health law would be without the federal Medicare stat-
ute. We would be left with state law, medical malpractice and some
of bioethics (the areas that are not reliant on problems that arise
mostly because Medicare has funded more technologically intensive
end-of-life care), for example. Health law as a field certainly would
not have developed as it has without the robust growth of the industry
that Medicare kindled.
THOSE WHO CAN, TEACH
I know that the sentiment is commonly stated as "those who can,
do; those who can't, teach." That has not been my experience with the
health law teachers who taught me while I was a student and thereaf-
ter, nor of the health lawyers who gift the field and our students as
authors, adjunct faculty, and mentors.
I have had the benefit of great teachers in Health Law from the
very beginning. Sylvia Law taught the first Health Law course I took
at NYU in 1975. She was then, and continues to be, an inspired and
inspiring teacher. I went on to take a course the next year in Social
Security Disability hearings and appeals with Jerry Mashaw at Yale.
His work in looking at process and procedure in one agency influ-
50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1261 (2000) (discussing the impact of Medicare on many areas
of health law that are seemingly unrelated to the original purpose of Medicare).
" Several significant federal regulatory efforts directly applicable to health
care endeavors are supported by the commerce power, including the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2000) and the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). Although not directed solely toward
health care, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000), which is supported by the
commerce power, has certainly had a significant effect on it. The federal taxing
power has also provided an entry for federal regulation of health care organizations
especially through controls exerted over tax-exempt status. See, Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). While the federal government garnered tre-
mendous power over health care through the Medicare statute, the struggle for power
over medical practice as between the federal government and the state governments
continues on other fronts. Currently, two issues regarding the allocation of power
over the regulation of medical practice in the prescription of controlled substances are
being litigated in Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632-639 (9th Cir. 2002), petition
for cert, filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. July 7, 2003)(No. 03-40) (regarding federal
investigations of physicians recommending medical marijuana to patients, in compli-
ance with California law but arguably in violation of the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act) and Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002) (regarding
the preemption of the Oregon physician-assisted suicide statute by the federal Con-
trolled Substances Act).
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enced my own lifelong interest in the work of agencies in health care.
When I began teaching at Saint Louis University School of Law in
1978, I found that it was already offering several health law courses
taught by Michael Wolff, a great lav^^er and generous colleague, now
a judge on the Missouri Supreme Court, and Jesse Goldner, who re-
mains a creative teacher, a strong scholar, and an ideal colleague. I've
learned from my health law teacher colleagues throughout the coun-
try, but none more so than my co-authors on the casebook.'^
Other authors in this special issue of Health Matrix are paying
tribute to the leading lights in health law and rightfully so. I am grate-
ful that they are providing us with the opportunity to pause a moment
and appreciate those brilliant and generous teachers that created and
enriched an entire field. Of course, some of our formative teachers
were not standing behind the podium; they have been sitting in our
classrooms sharing their enthusiasm for the field and challenging us to
think harder and do better.
Finally, some of our most important teachers have been those in-
dividuals who taught us through their suffering: The patients who
shared their personal stories with Elisabeth Kubler-Ross and changed
the way we looked at dying." The patients like Dax Cowart who
spoke openly about their pain and their personal choices.^" Family
members like Pete Busalacchi and Joe Cruzan who turned their grief
into efforts to confront the system that exacerbated their personal
tragedy.^' Those dozens or hundreds who have spoken to our health
law and bioethics classes, at our conferences, or simply who shared
their lives with us as we worked on ethics committees, or in litigation,
"* BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY
S. JosT & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
(4th ed. 2001).
" ELISABETH KuBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (MacMillan 1970)
(1969).
°^ E.g.. Confronting Death: Who Chooses. Who Controls? A Dialogue
Between Dax Cowart and Robert Burt, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1998,
at 14.
'^ The fathers of Christine Busalacchi and Nancy Cruzan, both from Mis-
souri, participated in conferences and in efforts to enact legislation that would better
serve families. In one memorable event during a conference jointly sponsored by the
American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics and Saint Louis University's Center for
Health Law Studies, Pete Busalacchi went to the microphone during a question-and-
answer period to ask the author of the Missouri Supreme Court's majority opinion in
Cruzan to ask why he wanted to cause families such pain. Conference, Ethics Com-
mittees and the Young: Families, Hospitals and the Courts Trying to Do the Right
Thing, sponsored by the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics and Saint
Louis University Schools of Law, Medicine & Nursing (May 19-21, 1994) (Adam's
Mark Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri). The exchange occurred during a session entitled
"Who Has Authority to Speak for the Child?" on May 19.
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or on legislation, or as we lived as sons and daughters. We owe a vast
debt to them.

